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Abstract
This work uses an ontological approach for the
medical domain to derive the level of privacy for
concepts specific to that domain. The authors
have previously produced a generic ontology for
privacy. In this paper, we describe a mapping
from the general (abstract and application
domain independent) privacy ontology to a
domain specific level for the medical domain and
how the general concepts influence the specific
instances, while medical terms and concepts
provide actual values for privacy principles that
essentially create the level of privacy a user
experiences.
Keywords: privacy, ontology, healthcare,
HealthConnect, health records
1. Introduction
Privacy in computing and communication has
many aspects and issues like legislation,
technologies or user perceived privacy, which is
the aspect of privacy a user experiences for data
related to him or her. The "real" world as opposed
to the digital world has to deal with privacy issues
as well, but as usually more effort is required to
gather and less effort to secure this information. It
is not seen as such a big issue compared with the
ability to collect, store and process information in
the digital world. However, legal implications
directly apply to both, the real world and the
digital world, hence requiring parties to collect
and use data carefully on a need to know basis
only.
I http://exe1.it.uts.edu.au
Although privacy issues are ubiquitous amongst
almost every domain, actual instances and
concepts as well as their influence on the overall
level of privacy for "interactions" are naturally
domain specific and must be addressed
accordingly. In this paper, we describe the
methodology to map the previously developed
generic ontology [6]1 to the specific ontology for
the medical domain.
2. Motivation and issues
2.1 Privacy
Privacy is considered one of the most important
issues nowadays with easy collection,
aggregation, linkage and storage facilities
available. The Internet provides users with the
ability to collect, store and share this kind of
information easily, but lacks a cohesive structure
making it more difficult to link data together by
an automated process. However, other vast data
sources (e.g. corporate databases) exist that are
much more structured and allow their users to
generate much clearer pictures about individuals.
Therefore, it becomes more and more difficult to
control others access to information about oneself.
The concept of privacy seems to be an
endogenous conception, as every person has a
different idea about what it means and how it
should be implemented to achieve it. Therefore, it
is necessary to find some common properties to
build a basic foundation. Starting with a common
dictionary definition, privacy would be "freedom
from unauthorized intrusion" [I]. Similar
technically imprecise definitions can be found in
other dictionaries such as Oxford English
Dictionary or dictionary. com. Therefore, it is
necessary to consider the definition of privacy by
people experienced in that domain. Naturally, it
has evolved over time and started with the
expression of "the right to be let alone" [2],
expressed by two lawyers in 1890. However, such
a definition is also not very precise yet nor very
usable nowadays, as one does not necessarily
want to be left alone just to "experience" or
"have" privacy. A better definition comes from
Privacilla [3], a website related to privacy related
policies and defines it as "the subjective condition
a person experiences when two factors are in
place. First, he or she must have the power to
control information about him- or herself. Second,
he or she must exercise that control consistent
with his or her interests and values". This
definition describes privacy in a much better and
precise way and it sounds more logical to be in
control of information related to oneself than just
be left alone. A similar statement has been made
by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, defining
privacy as "the right to control access to one's
person and to information about oneself' [4].
Trying to make it even clearer, privacy is not
about information itself, but the control of that
information by a cognitive entity, which is related
to it. In order to distinguish such information from
other "normal" information, we call this type of
information, which is about someone and could
potentially identify someone, "Personal
Identifiable Information" (PH). Hence, if
information cannot be linked to or is about a
certain entity, which could have potential interests
in controlling it, privacy matters usually do not
apply.
Previously, privacy protection has been tried to be
accomplished by utilising mechanisms that
control access to personal identifiable
information. However, it is not the data subject,
which is the entity the data is related to, to control
access to personal identifiable information, but an
"authorised entity" controlling or maintaining the
system where the data is store. Needless to say
that such an "authorised entity" would have a
great deal of control over the information, its
release and access. Even more, the data subject
might not know or even have authorised that
entity to regulate access to its data, but just
accepted the fact explicitly or implicitly that there
is some sort of protection for its data. This can
also be seen as an implicit trust in such an entity
to do the "right thing" with the information made
available to that system by the entity.
2.2 Privacy and policies
As just stated, a person controlling information
about others could be of great danger to the
privacy of the data subjects it is controlling -
remembering that privacy is about the ability of
the data subject to control personally identifiable
information about themselves. Thus, privacy
policies have been established, accepted and are
now widely used and are backed up by legislation.
This gives users more confidence when providing
information about themselves if it is used in a
certain way or to inform them at least how it is
used. Privacy policies are usually set up and
governed by certain rules and regulations that
apply in the territory the entity collecting
information is located in, leading to different
privacy policies in different regions (e.g. privacy
legislation in Europe compared to Australia). The
problem with privacy policies is their different
semantics and their dependency on the domain
they are applied to. While privacy policies within
the same domain (and possibly region for
regulatory reasons) may have similar structures,
there is no semantic way of comparing them with
each other or even evaluating the level of privacy
they try to offer. They may just be (and are often)
written in a certain natural language (e.g.
English). This obviously creates problems with
precision, clarity and interoperability, making it
ambiguous for the reader who has to understand it
- being a person or software (agent). Different
persons would understand a privacy policy
differently, depending on the complexity and
clarity of the policy and naturally depending on
their "knowledge" about privacy and other
intrinsic factors (e.g. culture), making it a fuzzy
concept, making it hard or even impossible to
formulate privacy in a mathematically precise
way. Thus, software agents would have even
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more trouble "understanding" these kinds of
privacy policies due to the lack of precision.
2.3 Privacy on the web and P3P
On the web, privacy policies have been
established in a structured way with the
introduction of the Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) [5]. Basically, this formulates
certain statements about how resources (that is
personal or other information) are used for what
purpose, by whom and with what kind of
retention. As P3P is a platform designed for
websites, it covers mostly web-specific terms and
is specific to that domain only (omitting the fact
that extensions are possible, but their actual
values are not standardised). Considering the
initial issue that not all data is on or accessible via
the web (in fact, a majority is actually not), other
privacy policies that also cover electronic as well
as non-electronic records from the same or other
domains are necessary and available to be
evaluated in a systematic way (by a human being
or preferably automatically by a software agent).
2.4 Privacy Ontology
The basic idea behind these thoughts leads to a
specified conceptualisation of the terminology
"privacy", omitting internal and personal factors
as it is difficult to capture them precisely. The
terminology used for such a conceptualisation and
formalisation is commonly known as "ontology".
An ontology specific to the domain privacy as
described in our previous work [6], showing the
different concepts and associations between them.
This helps to create interoperability as well as
allows one to derive the impact or level of privacy
a certain "transaction" (digital or non-digital) has
upon the data-subject when they agree to enter
into it. Furthermore, the data subject is not the
only one to benefit from such an evaluation of
privacy levels, but the other participants of a
transaction as well. They can essentially use the
ontology to model their (privacy) policies and
procedures to comply with regulations within
their domain. Also, it can help system developers
that need to implement any privacy functionality
or mechanisms by providing a guide to the
concepts and what privacy actually refers to,
without being an expert in that domain.
Such an ontology needs to be very general and
contains only very abstract concepts to make it
applicable to all sorts of different domains.
However, as every domain also has specific
concepts that need to be covered when
considering privacy, a general privacy ontology
cannot provide that level of detail. Hence, another
ontology, mapping from the generic one to a
specific domain is required to capture the domain
knowledge and add concepts that would influence
privacy within that domain [10]. It is highly likely
that a person with sufficient knowledge of that
domain is required to help create such a specific
ontology, as people that may not be familiar with
that domain might not cover all the issues
involved. A generic privacy ontology would
therefore be a template for the specific one,
providing the fundamental structure, notions and
principles that are ubiquitous to privacy.
Before it is actually possible to think about the
specific privacy concepts and issues of a certain
domain, e.g. healthcare, it is necessary to begin
with a formulation of generic concepts first. These
are likely to be domain independent and are
abstract enough to support this. Generally,
legislative documents provide a solid foundation
for those concepts and are usually covered by the
individual Privacy Acts of different nations.
Privacy notions and concepts are specified by the
"Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data" [7] and used by us as one
of the actual sources, as privacy legislation in the
European Union is more advanced (more
protective) than in many other countries.
However, a more comprehensive and concise
guide of those rules has been compiled by the
PRIME [8] and PISA [9] projects describing the
essential principles involved in the process of
privacy. Issues and principles that have been
found are: a) Intention and notification, b)
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Transparency, c) Finality principle, d) Legitimate
grounds of processing, e) Quality, f) Data
subject's rights, g) Processing by a processor, h)
Security, i) Accountability, j) Consent, k) Limited
Linkability (e.g. data mining), I) Openness, m)
Anonymity and n) Transfer of personal data
outside the EU (in general to countries with
different privacy protection laws).
2.5 Privacy issues in the medical domain
As every domain has specific issues and
additional concepts with privacy, so does the
medical domain. Generally speaking, privacy is
about health records, both electronic and non-
electronic ones. However, the medical area deals
with very sensitive information and has very
specific issues no other domain comprehends.
These issues also greatly influence the importance
of certain privacy principles, for example, security
could be considered less of an issue in the health
domain than consent. The reason for that is the
protection of vital interests of a data subject. This
means that health records cannot be made totally
secure (e.g. encrypted) in a way that only the data
subject can access it, as emergency situations may
require access to those records when the data
subject cannot authorise access (e.g. the data
subject is unconscious and his or her life is at
stake). Consent on the other hand is much more
important here, as it is vital for the data subject to
specify what entities may access the data under
what circumstances (emergencies excepted).
Needless to say, consent needs to be backed up by
a strong legislative framework and an intact
implementation, but the influential character of
those two principles is different from other
domains.
3. Ontological privacy support
This section gives a brief overview of the generic
privacy ontology as outlined in [6] to show the
different concepts used and how they are linked to
each other to support privacy, as well as the
different privacy principles and their influence on
the overall level of privacy.
Going back to the definition of privacy. the
general idea is to control the access and use of
personal identifiable information by the data
subject or an entity authorised by them.
Therefore, the ontology is based around the
concepts of "Data Subject", "Resource" and
"Resourcel.Jser" that accesses this "Resource".
Every concept of the generic privacy ontology has
certain attributes, which mayor may not contain
actual values that describe how the concept
influences the overall level of privacy. Actual
values may not be possible (as just stated), as it is
domain unspecific and therefore not necessarily
known how big the actual impact may be.
However, a relative value is assigned, which
describes how a particular principle within a
concept relates to principles in related concepts.
For example, the concept of "Resource" can have
different types of "Resourcelilement", which can




case, an AnonymousResourceElement would
have a higher relative value for the principle of
anonymity (m) than the concept of
PseudoAnonymousResourceElement. The actual
values are not determined or used here, as they are
to be defined by a domain expert, when creating
an actual instance of the generic ontology for a
specific domain (e.g. healthcare). Hence, a
domain expert would create actual subtypes or
subconcepts of a certain concept and assign actual
values as well as their influential "character" on
the overall level of privacy. Due to the nature of
privacy, these values are all fuzzy in the sense that
there is no mathematically precise definition on
how a concept is assessed and values are assigned
to the principles, but the domain expert would
have sufficient knowledge to specify at least
fuzzy ones, which is adequate. Once certain
subconcepts have been created, the domain expert
has to check whether there are links to other
concepts that may require consideration as well
by going through the ontology like a map. For
example, if a certain ResourceUser has been
defined, the ontology would suggest or even
implicitly force one to check the "Territory" this
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ResourceUser is located in to determine the
"Judicature" of it and what "Privacyl.aws" apply.
This will then reflect back to the overall level of
privacy, as a Judicature with weak privacy
protection laws would most likely result in an
overall weaker level of privacy, if that
ResourceUser is involved in a transaction utilising
the resources of the data subject.
This general ontology has been entered into
Protege, which we use to generate the relevant
OWL code for implementation, testing and
evaluation.
4. Ontology instance for the medical
domain
Firstly, this section shows the principles for using
the generic ontology in the medical domain in
general. We emphasize the classification of
concepts that are used in this domain. Afterwards,
we describe a specific example by classifying an
"interpreter" in the medical domain.
4.1 General classification principles
As described in the last section, the generic
ontology requires the help of a domain expert to
create a domain-specific extension, which
elaborates the actual concepts of that domain.
Furthermore, it is necessary to assess these
concepts with regards to privacy and assign
proper albeit fuzzy values for the influence and
the actual values of the privacy level for that
concept. Obviously, the medical domain is very
sensitive with regards to information and their use
and disclosure, usually making them very strictly
regulated. To create an instance of the privacy
ontology for the medical domain, we consulted
the official Privacy Manual of the Department of
Health, NSW [II] and extracted necessary and
required concepts. Nevertheless, we only focus on
major concepts and won't elaborate small sub-
concepts that may have only little additional
influence on the privacy level as our purpose here
is to provide an exposition of the methodology
and not describe the whole ontology by itself.
Some of the concepts found with regards to
personal information are shown in Figure I with





in conjunction with Low
health services
Images (e.g. X-Ray) Medium
Table 1: Resources & Level of Sensitivity
The level of sensitivity for data in the medical
domain is also relative to the level of sensitivity
(meaning importance of privacy) of the domain
itself, meaning that the high sensitivity of that
domain makes a resource/concept with medium
level of sensitivity in that domain still highly
sensitive itself, but less sensitive than a highly
sensitive resource in that domain. Figure I
demonstrates this by comparing a highly sensitive
resource in the demographic domain (e.g. date of
birth) with a low sensitive resource (e.g.
Information collected in conjunction with health
services) in the medical domain. As one can see,
the highly sensitive information of the
demographic domain is still lower than the low











Figure 1: Sensitivity of resources in a domain
When combining different resources with
different sensitivity levels as a single resource, the
level of sensitivity is defined as the
function sj; == p(srl'""snJ where r depicts the
resource and Sf stands for the level of sensitivity
of r. The function p maps the sensitivity levels of
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the resources r] ... r, III such a way
that Y k = r\ ... 1"" ---jo S rl ..n > S i : This simply states
that the level of sensitivity of a combined resource
is always higher than the sensitivity of any of its
components. Assuming that we have sensitivity
levels on a scale from 0 to 10, where lOis the
highest level, single concepts would be assigned a
level between I and 9. The role of the function p
is to combine those single values to combined
levels, to generate values greater than 9, but never
actually reach 10, which is an upper boundary that
is only reached when the sensitivity of an
unlimited number of resources is combined. The
lower boundary (zero) is assumed never to be
reached, as perfect privacy does not exist in
general.
When we classify resources with different
sensitivity levels, this is done in a fuzzy way and
may differ from data subject to data subject. It is
generally assumed however that the majority of
users will have a similar approach to classify
information - at least in terms of relativity within
the domain (e.g. mental health is more sensitive
than the question if one is an organ donor). If a
data subject is not satisfied with the sensitivity
levels a domain expert has assigned to the
different concepts, alteration is possible in order
to accommodate the data subject.
Classifying other concepts, e.g. an interpreter or
third party health provider is generally more
difficult, as one has to classify first what exactly
that concept does, how it interacts and what other
concepts it is linked to.
4.2 Example of classifying a specific
concept in the medical domain
We will now show an example for such a
classification for the concept of "Interpreter",
which would be done by a domain expert to create
this domain specific concept (regardless of the
domain it actually is). However, we will only
show the changes that happen to the level of
privacy when the interpreter is added and not the
whole scenario, as this would be fairly lengthy
and cannot be described III the limited space
available in this paper.
Firstly, it is necessary to determine where the
concept of Interpreter is most likely going to be
"attached" to, meaning to figure out what the next
logical level of generalisation in the hierarchy
might be. Using a top-down approach when going
through the ontology, the concept of interpreter is
clearly an entity, which represents a cognitive
agent (the actual interpreter as a person or a
software agent). Therefore it is governed by a
certain jurisdiction, depending on the territory the
person belongs to. This in return may have
implications for the level of privacy, as the
privacy regulations the interpreter is bound by,
may differ from the one the hospital is regulated
by. However, a domain expert would be required
to determine if it differs or not. If the jurisdiction
is the same as the client's one (the hospital, or a
GP), the level of privacy would not be influenced.
Stepping down one level in the hierarchy, it is
also clear that an interpreter will have something
to do with access to patient information, making
them a "Resource.Accessor", which is classified as
a concept that will deal with certain personal
information at some stage, although this may not
even see the data but just "pass" it on to some
other entity. However, as the interpreter will be a
recipient of personal information at some point,
they are also a "Resource User". The latter concept
is important, as a recipient of personal
information is governed by a "PrivacyProcess",
which itself is governed by a certain "Policy" that
outlines the conditions of that process and also
links to safeguards that may protect the transfer of
information from a "ResourceAuthoriser" to the
recipient. Furthermore, interpreters will also
directly access personal information, making them
a "ResourceReader" that can read information, but
may not alter or delete any part of it. However, an
interpreter is a very specific ResourceReader, the
so called "Resourcel-landler", inferring that they
have "reading" access/consent and additionally
may "translate" information in a way that content
is not altered semantically. Another example of
such a "ResourceHandler" would be a person
entering data from a form (on paper) that has been
filled out by a data subject into a digital system.
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However, translating information into another
language for example may not be completely
accurate, but the interpreter should make every
reasonable attempt to translate as closely as
possible to the original version without adding
any own opinions or values.
Now that the position of the concept "Interpreter"
as an instance of a ResourceHandler has been
determined within the ontology, we can now look
at the levels of privacy and how the concepts
influence them. We assume that the actual
interpreter is a real person, working in the hospital
and communicating verbally with the patient.
Being a real person (and not a software agent that
translates), the interpreter is actually an entity, but
as the person works for the same hospital, it is
within the same jurisdiction as the other
ResourceUsers (e.g. doctors, nurses), the patient
may have given consent to. Therefore, the level of
privacy, particularly, the privacy principle
"Transfer of data outside certain legal boundaries"
is not influenced and can be used from the
original evaluation of the hospital (which is not
shown here). If the translator were a software
component, similar rules would apply. This is
because it would run under the authority of the
hospital and a separate check for jurisdiction
would not be necessary. The patient/client will
have an agreement with the interpreter, whether it
is explicit or implicit. We assume an implicit
agreement, which is not written down in any
form. Thus, the patient would assume that it is
essentially the very same one that has been
established between them and the hospital (or
doctor or nurse). Due to the fact that an interpreter
is a ResourceReader, they are not allowed to
disclose information to anyone else. This seems to
be a contradiction, as an interpreter needs to "tell"
the translated content to a healthcare professional.
However, this can be regarded as translating the
content (without alteration) and handing it back to
the client, who then forwards it to the relevant
doctor or nurse, which would receive the
information directly normally if no interpreter
were necessary. As previously stated, the
ResourceUser (which the Interpreter is implicitly)
is the recipient of a resource, the resource must be
transferred from the client or any other
ResourceAuthoriser (which does not exist in our
example) to the interpreter. The communication
path in our case is defined as
"VerbalCommunication''. As any communication
path is defined as having a safeguard to protect it,
we need to defme one here as well. For simplicity
reasons and to stay realistic, we simply assume
that being in a separate room with the patient is
quite a strong safeguard. We ignore issues like
other patients in the same room, audio monitoring
or people that could read lips. The concept of
Interpreter also assigns a value to the privacy
principle of "Purpose", which is essentially
"Translating between languages" and nothing
else. Obviously, this requires the interpreter just
to translate the information provided by the client
and not to do anything else with it - referring
back to our previous argument about disclosure.
The privacy principle of Quality may be
influenced by an interpreter, as the accuracy of
information might degrade during translation, but
we assume that is negligible.
Concluding this section, one can see that an
interpreter can have an impact on the overall level
of privacy. However, the example tried to keep
the level of privacy as high as possible, for
example by using an internal interpreter,
assuming similar agreement policies (albeit
implicit, which can often has an impact) and
talking in a separate room for security reason.
5. Example from HeaIthConnect
This section uses an example from HealthConnect
[12] when registering a new client to show the
privacy issues in the digital and non-digital world
and where the ontology can help the client/patient
to make decisions upon what he can expect from a
level of privacy perspective. We will not show
specific technical insights, but briefly describe
where the ontology could be "hooked in" to help
evaluating the expected outcome.
"Mr. Kevin Stephenson, a 55 year-old male with
diabetes mellitus, presents for the first time to a
general practitioner's surgery and informs the
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receptionist that he is feeling extremely unwell.
The receptionist asks if he has an existing
HealtliConnect record which he denies and the
receptionist asks him if we would like to register.
He asks Kevin to fill out the usual surgery form
for a new client. This includes Kevin's
demographic details (name, sex, DOB, address,
contact details) and basic health information (his
allergy to penicillin, diabetes diagnosis, treatment
for depression and recent knee operation) and
registers him into the local system. The
receptionist gives Kevin a brochure that outlines
the scope and benefits of HealthConnect and
includes and internet address for further
information and contact information for the
HealthConnect helpdesk. Kevin advises that he is
already familiar with HealthConnect and would
like to register. The receptionist helps him
complete and sign the registration and consent
forms. Kevin selects the standing consent option
(ie consent to authorised providers unless
othenvise revoked) where access to his
Health Connect record is made available to a
nominated list of providers, although he chooses
to limit access to information from consultations
involving mental health issues to his psychiatrist
and general practitioner. He understands that in
emergencies this limitation may be overridden but
a review of such an action would be undertaken.
The collected registration and consent
information is sent to HealthConnect from the
local system. Following an immediate check for
an existing registration, Kevin is provisionally
registered pending receipt of his signed form and
issue of his HealthConnect access control token. "
[12]
Although this example is fairly small, it contains
quite a few privacy sensitive issues. A few of
those issues are related to the real world, while
others refer to the digital world. For simplicity
reasons, we will omit the fact that Kevin needs to
be registered to the local system first but
concentrate on the direct registration for
HealthConnect.
In order to show that the ontology can be used for
the non-digital world as well, we will now briefly
outline how this might work. The relevant work
(e.g. conceptualising terms) would be done by a
domain expert upfront and not by a client. By
entering the surgery, Kevin also enters the domain
of health care, which requires building or utilising
a mapping from the core ontology to the medical
one in order to discover and use the relevant
concepts. As Kevin decides to register with
HealthConnect, he has to fill out the relevant form
and provide some details about his person.
Naturally, Kevin needs to read and understand the
privacy policy of HealthConnect that is written in
natural language. It is necessary to conceptualise
and clarify the statements in the policy and create
an appropriate mapping from the core ontology to
the specific statements of the policy. The next
step would be a mapping between the type of data
he enters into the form, which would be
demographic information and therefore
information that identifies him. Furthermore,
Kevin is required to use his real identity and not
an arbitrary or anonymous one, which is then
checked by the receptionist to make sure his
information is accurate. Entering both,
demographic information and his basic health
information in the same form makes it a very
sensitive resource, especially considering he also
enters mental health data which is highly sensitive
in the already sensitive domain of health (see
section 4). By signing the document with his
written signature, he legally certifies the
document as being accurate, making the document
even more sensitive, as the provider
(HealthConnect) is guaranteed that the
information is precise and really about him. The
physical nature of the form (paper) also adds
privacy implications, as paper is durable and
needs to be retained during his membership with
HealthConnect as legal proof of the information
he provides. Therefore, safeguard issues arise that
directly influence the security principle, e.g. how
is the paper stored and who has access to it and
how this is enforced. Furthermore, Kevin has to
fill out the form in the practise and pass it on to
the receptionist, which could require us to address
those circumstances as well. For example,
someone could read the information while he
writes it or it could just lie on the desk at the
counter unprotected. However, in order to stay
realistic, we will not take those special issues into
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consideration, but assume that filling out the form
and passing it on to the receptionist is reasonably
secure. The receptionist IS also a
"Resourcel-landler" as described in section 4, as
it's his/her duty to "convert" the hardcopy form
into a digital one without alteration or disclosing
the information to anyone else. Obviously the
pathway that is used to convert the document
from the hardcopy form also plays a role, e.g. if
the communication with the online system is
secure.
Once the data is stored in the digital system, it is
logically important for the client to make sure the
data is only used in a way he wants it to be used.
In general, one would assume that the data is
protected by safeguards (e.g. encrypted), but due
to the nature of electronic health records, the
influence of the principle of security may have
exceptions when compared to other domains. This
is related to emergency situations where data must
be available even if the patient is unconscious and
therefore unable to give consent to access it. If
health records were encrypted in such a way that
they cannot be accessed in this situation, the vital
interests of the data subject (e.g. life or death
situation) would be "violated". For the data
subject, a greater importance and influence on the
overall level of privacy would therefore lie in the
consent to make sure only authorised people can
access it and the notification whenever personal
information are used, regardless of how this is
implemented by the provider, as long as it is
guaranteed (and legally backed up).
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper. we have presented how a medical
privacy ontology derived from a generic one can
support information about privacy levels during
certain interactions. The medical mapping, which
is an extension of the core privacy ontology, is
hereby used to support the specific concepts of
that domain. The actual instance of that domain
provides actual values for the influence of the
specific concepts to the level of privacy and the
relevant privacy principles. As the medical
extension only supplies additional concepts and
values for that domain, the structure of the corc
privacy ontology provides the different
interactions and core concepts to support a
derivation of privacy levels experienced.
As described, the example cannot be described
exhaustively due to the nature and complexity of
the medical domain, requiring incorporation of a
large amount of concepts and their influences on
the level of privacy. Utilising expert domain
knowledge, the domain specific instance of the
ontology is currently built and implemented to use
automatic tools for deriving the actual level of
privacy a user experiences. We will apply this to
HealthConnect to see how good the support for
privacy for electronic health records is, where
problems exist and how they might be possibly
addressed.
The mapping itself is not limited to the medical
domain, but is used in an exemplary manner and
other domains will follow later on, especially to
evaluate privacy when covering a number of
different domains, while referring back to the
basic concepts of privacy in the core ontology.
Subsequently, the core ontology will be used to
"tweak" the privacy experience of data subjects
on an individual level, as they are able to set their
own influential values for the different principles.
This can be applied to different and new domains,
even though the user may not have actually used
any privacy preferences for this new domain
before, as long as the domain specific one can be
mapped to the core ontology.
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